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Implications of Recent Agreements
for United States-China Trade
Introduction
The Chinese contend that they do not like lawyers and therefore wish
American firms would exclude them from their negotiating teams. Some
knowledgeable China scholars believe this attitude is rapidly changing and
that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is moving as quickly as it can to
reestablish a competent group of Chinese lawyers. Regardless of these views,
the United States legal community will play a significant role in advising
United States firms on China trade.
On her trip to China in May 1979, then Secretary of Commerce Kreps
initialed a trade agreement ad referendum, ' signed a claims settlement agree-
ment on blocked assets,I and signed a trade exhibitions agreement. 3 The trade
agreement was subsequently signed by Ambassador Woodcock and Minister
of Foreign Trade Li Qiang on July 7, 1979.' These three agreements es-
tablished a broader basis for growth in United States-China trade.
I. The Trade Agreement
The initial effort by the executive branch in recent decades to deal with the
issue of trade agreements with communist countries occurred in the mid-
1960s. On May 11, 1966, at the direction of the President, the Secretary of
State sent to the Congress proposed legislation to provide the President with
the authority necessary to negotiate trade agreements with the Soviet Union
*Mr. Jenkins is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Director of the Bureau
of East-West Trade.
'Classified document.
'Agreement on Settlement of Claims, May I1, 1979, United States-People's Republic of
China, Pub. L. No. 89-497, 80 Stat. 271 (1979). T.I.A.S. No. 9306.
'Trade Agreement, July 7, 1979, United States-People's Republic of China, 18 I.L.M. 1041
(1979).
'Treaties: Current Actions, 79 DEP'T STATE BULL. No. 2030, at 69 (1979).
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and other communist nations of Eastern Europe.' The purpose of these
agreements was to be the widening of trade in peaceful goods when such
agreements would serve the interests of the United States. On May 17 the
East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966 was introduced in the Senate by Sena-
tor Magnuson on behalf of Senator Mansfield and himself.6 On May 24 a bill
was introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman Keogh.'
These pieces of legislation contained five principal provisions:'
1. The first provision stated the purpose of the Act, particularly to use
peaceful trade and related contacts with communist countries to advance the
long-range interests of the United States.9
2. The second provision authorized the President to enter into a commer-
cial agreement with a communist country if he determined it would promote
the purposes of the Act, if he felt the national interest would be promoted,
and if benefits to the United States would be equivalent to those accruing to
the other party.'"
3. The third provision stated some of the benefits the United States hoped
to gain in such agreements."
4. The fourth provision limited each agreement to an initial period of three
years, renewable for three-year periods. It required that each agreement pro-
vide for regular review of operations and of relevant aspects of the relations
between the United States and the other party. ' 2 It also required that each
agreement be subject to suspension or termination at any time on reasonable
notice.'"
5. The fifth and most central provision of the Act, however, recommended
by the responsible groups studying this matter, authorized the President to
proclaim most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment for the goods of communist
nations with which a commercial agreement was made under the Act. Such
MFN treatment continued only so long as the agreement was in effect."
The President would have had the authority to suspend or terminate any
proclamation made pursuant to this Act whenever he determined that the
other party to the agreement was no longer fulfilling its obligations under the
agreement, or that suspension or termination was in the national interest. 5
The authority of the Act would not have extended to the People's Republic
of China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba or the German Democratic
Republic.' 6 The bill expressly provided that it did not modify or amend the
'Exec. Com. No. 2397, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REc. 10337 (1966).
'S. 3363, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REC. 10729 (1966).
'H.R. 15212, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REC. 11346 (1966).
8S. 3363, supra note 6, and H.R. 15212, supra note 7, contain the same provisions.
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Battle Act' 7 or the Export Control Act,'" which together controlled the ex-
port of military articles, strategic goods and technology which would ad-
versely affect the national security and welfare of the United States.' 9 The
Act would not have changed in any way existing laws and regulations which
prohibit aid and limit credit to communist countries.
The Act also would have provided that before the President enters into any
agreement under the Act, he should seek information with respect to it from
all of the United States government agencies concerned, interested private
persons, and other appropriate sources.2" The procedures for adjustment
assistance and escape-clause relief set forth in the Trade Expansion Act'
would have been applicable in the case of articles imported in increased quan-
tities as a result of MFN tariff treatment extended to a country in accordance
with an agreement pursuant to the Act. Antidumping laws and all other laws
for the protection of United States industry, agriculture, and labor would
have remained in full effect. In addition, problems of interest to American
business were to be dealt with under the consultation procedures or in pe-
riodic negotiations to be provided for by an agreement under the Act.
Congress, however, took no definitive action on these bills. Subsequently,
on October 18, 1972, the basic elements of a commercial agreement such as
that proposed in the 1966 bills were incorporated in a trade agreement be-
tween the USSR and the United States that was signed in Moscow.2" Al-
though many of its provisions were and are still being implemented, the
agreement never entered into force because of the Soviet rejection of the
restrictions contained in the Trade Act of 1974.23
That Act contained proposals similar to most of those in the proposed
East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966,24 as well as some radically different
elements. The Act required that any bilateral commercial agreement nego-
tiated within the Act should:
(1) be limited to an initial period specified in the agreement which shall be no more
than 3 years from the date the agreement enters into force; except that it may be
renewable for additional periods, each not to exceed 3 years; if-
(A) a satisfactory balance of concessions in trade and services has been main-
tained during the life of such agreement, and
(B) the President determines that actual or foreseeable reductions in United
States tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade resulting from multilateral negotia-
tions are satisfactorily reciprocated by the other party to the bilateral agree-
ment;
"Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act), 22 U.S.C. § 1611 (1976).
'Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (expired 1969) (current version at 50
U.S.C. § 2401 (1976)).
"H.R. 15212, supra note 7, at § 10.
2-ld. § 7.
'Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1861 (repealed 1975).
"U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreements on Trade and Lend-Lease, 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. No.
1743, at 581 (1972).
2"19 U.S.C. § 2101 (Supp. 1979).
"See notes 6-7 supra.
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(2) provide that it is subject to suspension or termination at any time for national
security reasons, or that the other provisions of such agreement shall not limit the
rights of any party to take any action for the protection of its security interests;
(3) include safeguard arrangements
(A) providing for prompt consultations whenever either actual or prospective
imports cause or threaten to cause, or significantly contribute to, market dis-
ruption and
(B) authorizing the imposition of such import restrictions as may be appropri-
ate to prevent such market disruption;
(4) if the other party to the bilateral agreement is not a party to the Paris Conven-
tion for the Protection of Industrial Property, provide rights for United States
nationals with respect to patents and trademarks in such country not less than the
rigbts specified in such convention;
(5) if the other party to the bilateral agreement is not a party to the Universal
Copyright Convention, provide rights for United States nationals with respect to
copyrights in such country not less than the rights specified in such convention;
(6) in the case of an agreement entered into or renewed after Jan. 3, 1975, provide
arrangements for the protection of industrial rights and processes;
(7) provide arrangements for the settlement of commercial differences and dis-
putes;
(8) in the case of an agreement entered into or renewed after January 3, 1975,
provide arrangements for the promotion of trade, which may include those for the
establishment or expansion of trade and tourist promotion offices, for facilitation
of activities of governmental commercial officers, for the participation in trade
fairs and exhibits, and for the sending of trade missions, and for facilitation of
entry, establishment, and travel of commercial representatives;
(9) provide for consultations for the purpose of reviewing the operation of the
agreement and relevant aspects of relations between the United States and the other
party; and
(10) provide such other arrangements of a commercial nature as will promote the
purposes of this Act.2"
The same section provided for approval by Congress before such an agree-
ment could enter into effect." 6
The Act did not stop there, however. Sections 402 (Freedom of Emigration
in East-West Trade-the Jackson-Vanik Amendment) 7 and 409 (Freedom to
Emigrate to Join a Very Close Relative in the United States) 8 of the Act
injected the "freedom of emigration" issue into East-West trade and im-
posed a number of requirements on the President regarding the attitudes and
practices of a communist country towards various aspects of emigration by
its citizens. Requirements for presidential waivers of these new elements were
spelled out in detail. 9 The extension of MFN treatment, access to United
States governmental credits, and conclusion of any commercial agreement
with a communist country were also conditioned on meeting the require-
ments of these sections.3"




"Id. §§ 2432(c), 2439(d).
11ld. §§ 2432(a), 2439(a).
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Section 4031' (United States Personnel Missing in Action in South East
Asia) introduced the "missing in action" personnel issue and set similar con-
ditions for extension of MFN treatment, access to United States governmen-
tal financial facilities and entering into a commercial agreement.
I. United States-China Trade Agreement
The United States-China trade agreement was initialed ad referendum on
May 14, 1979, in Beijing and Canton and signed July 7, 1979 in Beijing. 2 It
was negotiated to provide a framework for future United States-China trade
relations in accordance with section 405 of the Trade Act of 1974. The agree-
ment contains the elements required under section 405 for bilateral agree-
ments between the United States and nonmarket economy countries, and
includes other provisions for the promotion of bilateral trade.
A. Promotion of Trade
The agreement contains general commitments by the parties to promote
the development of their bilateral trade. It provides that such trade shall be
effected on the basis of commercial contracts and considerations.
B. Nondiscriminatory Treatment
The agreement provides for reciprocal nondiscriminatory treatment of the
parties' imports and exports, including nondiscriminatory (MFN) tariff
treatment. This means that the products of both countries will be subject to
the generally lower MFN rates of duties in their respective tariff schedules.
The agreement, at the behest of the Chinese negotiators, takes note of
China's situation as "a developing country." It provides for equitable treat-
ment in the event that quantitative restrictions are imposed. It commits each
party to reciprocate satisfactorily for concessions made by the other in the
area of trade and services.
C. Business Facilitation
The agreement addresses issues related to the facilitation of business activi-
ties, including the establishment of business offices, the stationing of busi-
ness representatives, and improvement in the conditions under which these
offices operate. It provides for nondiscriminatory treatment in business facil-
itation matters. The agreement also includes provisions regarding visits by
economic, trade and industrial groups.
D. Government Trade Offices
The agreement takes note of the importance of government trade offices,
and contains undertakings to facilitate their operations.
3
'ld. § 2433.32See note 4 supra.
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E. Financial Provisions
The agreement contains provisions regarding international payments and
facilities for international financial, currency, and banking transactions. It
looks toward the participation of financial institutions of each country in
appropriate banking services, of the other country, particularly in interna-
tional trade and finance. In addition, the two parties agree to facilitate the
availability of official export credits in accordance with applicable laws and
procedures.
F. Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights
The agreement provides for reciprocal and equivalent protection of pa-
tents, trademarks, and copyrights. It also includes provisions for the protec-
tion of other industrial rights and processes.
G. Resolution of Bilateral Trade Problems
Bilateral trade problems, including market disruption due to rapidly rising
imports, will be the subject of prompt consultations. Should such consulta-
tions not result in a satisfactory resolution within a reasonable period of time,
either party may take whatever action it believes appropriate. In an emer-
gency, action may be taken before consultations are held.
H. Resolution of Commercial Disputes
The agreement endorses nonjudicial procedures, including third-country
arbitration, for the prompt settlement of commercial disputes.
I. National Security
The agreement leaves the parties free to take whatever actions they deem
necessary to protect their security interests, as required under the Trade Act
of 1974.
J. Entry Into Force and Termination
The agreement will be for a three-year, renewable term. It can be sus-
pended if either party loses its domestic authority to carry out its obligations.
The signing of the United States-China agreement marks a significant step
toward improvement in trade and economic relations. The agreement pro-
vides a framework for increasing trade and commercial contacts between the
two countries. Its provisions include general principles as well as specific
privileges and protections for United States firms trading with China.
The agreement reflects the requirements of section 405 of the Trade Act of
1974. It satisfies the specific requirements of that section for a commercial
agreement with a nonmarket economy country, including safeguards against
potential market disruption, protection of patents, copyrights and trade-
marks, and improved conditions to facilitate the activities of business repre-
sentatives.
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II!. Claims and Assets Agreement
The major obstacle to normalizing relations with the People's Republic of
China (PRC) was the absence of a signed agreement on claims and assets. The
absence of such an agreement seriously and adversely affected private Ameri-
can business involvement with the PRC in, for example, the fields of bank-
ing, shipping, aviation, trade exhibitions, and certain aspects of trade trans-
actions.
A claims settlement agreement on blocked assets was negotiated with the
PRC early in 1979, and was initialed on March 2 by then United States
Treasury Secretary Blumenthal and PRC Finance Minister Zhang Jingfu 3
On May 11, 1979, this agreement was signed in Beijing by Secretary Kreps
and Minister Zhang.3 '
The agreement provides for PRC payment of $80.5 million to the United
States. Of that amount, $30 million will be paid on October 1, 1979, and the
remainder in five annual installments of $10.1 million commencing Octo-
ber 1, 1980." Distribution of the PRC's payment to claimants will be made
by the United States government, beginning soon after October 1, 1979.36
The United States on January 31, 1980 unblocked all PRC-related assets
which remained blocked as of March 2, 1979, the date of the initialing of the
agreement." The agreement does not take any position as to the ownership of
those assets.
The United States claims settled under the agreement are those held by
United States nationals against the PRC arising from any nationalization,
expropriation, intervention, or other taking of property, or from any special
measures directed against property of United States nationals between Octo-
ber 1, 1949, the date the PRC was established, and July 7, 1979, the date on
which the agreement was signed." Claims arising before November, 1966,
have been adjudicated by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission pur-
suant to the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as amended, 9 and
were certified to the Secretary of State in 1972.
The Commission certified a total of 384 claims having a value of $196.9
million. Of this amount, claims of individuals totaled $14.5 million; claims of
religious and other nonprofit organizations, $58.3 million; and claims of
corporate and other business entities, $124.1 million.4 1
The Chinese claims settled are those of the PRC, PRC nationals and others
subject to PRC jurisdiction or control, arising from the United States block-
"Chronology: March 1979, 79 DEP'T STATE BULL. No. 2026, at 69 (1979).
"Agreement on Settlement of Claims, supra note 2.
"Id. art. I1.
" Id. art. IV.
"Id. art. 11(b).
"Id. art. i(a).
"'22 U.S.C. § 1621 (1950), as amended by Law of Aug. 9, 1955, ch. 645, § I, 69 Stat. 562.
'FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS 507 (1972).
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ing of Chinese assets, between December 17, 1950, and the date of signature
of the agreement." These assets now total approximately $80.5 million. The
agreement does not cover claims of the United States government against the
PRC.
IV. Eximbank Credits, Credit Guarantees and Credit Insurance
As noted earlier, sections 402 and 409 placed requirements on the President
to make certain determinations on the emigration policies and practices of a
communist country before he would be free to extend MFN treatment, to
provide access to United States governmental financing facilities (except
CCC credits for the PRC), or to enter into a commercial agreement. Assum-
ing that the United States-PRC trade agreement were submitted to the Con-
gress with the required determinations and approved by the Congress, where
would Eximbank stand regarding the PRC?
First, the President would have to make a national interest determination
that it is desirable to extend finance to the PRC, as required by section
2(b)(2)(B) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended.' 2
Second, Eximbank has outstanding claims of about $26 million plus ac-
crued interest against the PRC (which have yet to be negotiated).
Third, Eximbank does not now have any funds budgeted for financing to
the PRC and new executive branch and congressional authorization would be
required to permit the bank to extend any significant financing to the PRC.
The signing of the trade agreement and the claims and assets agreement
were helpful and encouraging steps, but much remains to be accomplished
before Eximbank financial facilities become available to the PRC. During his
recent visit to the PRC, Vice-President Mondale told the Chinese that the
United States is prepared to establish Eximbank credit arrangements for the
PRC on a case-by-case basis up to a total of $2 billion over a five-year period.
He also said additional credit arrangements could be considered if develop-
ments warrant them. In the meantime, other countries such as the United
Kingdom, Japan, France, and Canada are making substantial sums available
to the PRC, mostly but not entirely in direct support of actual or intended
exports from their countries to the PRC. United States firms must continue
to trade without the important support of the Eximbank until the remaining
hurdles are overcome. It will not be easy going, but the progress already made
may help ease the way to increased United States-PRC trade.
V. Trade Exhibitions Agreement
On May 10, 1979, a separate agreement on trade exhibitions was signed in
Beijing by Secretary of Commerce Kreps and PRC Minister of Foreign Trade
Li Qiang. It became effective immediately.
"Agreement on Settlement of Claims, supra note 2, art. l(b).
'212 U.S.C. § 635(a)(2)(b)(2)(B) (1945).
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The agreement recognizes the importance of trade exhibitions to the devel-
opment of bilateral commercial ties and the promotion and increase of ex-
ports by both the United States and the PRC. It also provides for appropriate
assistance and facilitation by each party to assist the other in arranging and
holding trade exhibits and to assist in such matters as customs applicability,
participation by firms and organizations, interpreters, and security of goods
and personnel. Most important were the following elements:
I. Agreement that the PRC may hold "an economic and trade exhibition
from May to October, 1980, in the cities of New York, Chicago and San
Francisco, and exhibitions in these and other cities of the United States
in subsequent years."
2. Agreement that the United States "may hold an exhibition in Beijing in
1980 and exhibitions in Beijing and other cities in China in subsequent
years. "
3. Recognition that the United States Department of Commerce and the
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade are the key
organizations for assisting and facilitating these efforts.
The signing of this agreement and of the claims and assets agreement have
opened the way for trade exhibition efforts in 1980 and thereafter by both
parties. Efforts are now underway in the Commerce Department's Industry
and Trade Administration to prepare for a United States national exhibition
in Beijing in the fall of 1980.
Having set forth the basic facts and the trade implications of the recent
agreements signed or initialed between the United States and China, one
might ask what does it all mean? Basically, the two countries have taken
several critical steps forward in improving bilateral commercial relations,
and in opening the way to increased bilateral trade and, possibly, invest-
ment-in other words, the achievement of trade normalization. If this impe-
tus can be continued, United States firms should find it easier to become
more competitive in the China market and to realize a $5 billion level of
United States-PRC trade by 1985.

